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Abstract: Every country is a polluter and a victim of anthropogenic climate change. Inextricably 
linked, every greenhouse gas emitted from every corner of the world changes the atmospheric 
composition of the climate system. Viewing the climate change problem from this lens, every person 
from every country must play its part in mitigating and adapting to climate change. And every country 
is a developing country, in the sense of universality as conveyed by “Transforming Our World: the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development” (2030 Agenda). Goal 13 of the 2030 Agenda specifically 
recognises the United Nations Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as the primary forum of global 
climate governance. However, progress for legally binding quantified emissions reductions limitations 
(QERLs) mitigation targets under the UNFCCC-style multilateralism framework has yet to produce an 
effective response to the threat of global warming. The gap between currently pledged QERLs 
trajectories and global emissions levels consistent with limiting global warming to 2oC Celsius above 
pre-industrial temperatures remains large. It is therefore not surprising that a growing number of 
minilateralism-style proposals (e.g. climate clubs) have emerged in the literature as a way forward to 
promote QERLs actions in the post 2015 Paris Climate Summit era. This paper explores how climate 
clubs could potentially assist in catalysing greater international cooperation for effective QERLs 
actions. The paper then specifically investigates how the Alliance of Small Island Developing States 
(AOSIS) could assist in pioneering emerging international cooperation efforts to establish climate clubs 
to fast track QERLs actions. What makes AOSIS’s epic quest to be a member of the international 
climate clubs movement so important is the question of whether it can help navigate the international 
community towards using climate minilaterism-style clubs to complement UNFCCC-style multilaterism 
in the post 2015 Paris Climate Summit era. 
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1.0 Climate Clubs and AOSIS 
 
“We know the truth that many nations have contributed little to climate change but will be 
the first to feel its most destructive effects.  For some, particularly island nations…climate 
change is a threat to their very existence.”  President Barack Obama, November 30, 2015.2 
 
This paper explores how climate clubs could potentially assist in catalysing greater 
international cooperation for effective QERLs actions from a Small Island Developing States 
(SIDS) perspective. The paper then specifically investigates how the Alliance of Small Island 
Developing States (AOSIS) could assist in pioneering emerging international cooperation 
efforts to establish climate clubs to fast track QERLs actions. 
  
Subject to how one defines climate clubs, one could argue the Alliance of Small Island States 
(AOSIS) is an ad hoc type of climate club. AOSIS is a coalition of small island and low-lying 
coastal countries that share similar development challenges and concerns about the 
environment, especially their vulnerability to the adverse effects of climate change.3 It 
functions primarily as an ad hoc lobby and negotiating voice for Small Island Developing States 
(SIDS) within the United Nations system.  AOSIS has a membership of 44 States and 
observers4, drawn from all oceans and regions of the world: Africa, Caribbean, Indian Ocean, 
Mediterranean, Pacific and South China Sea. Thirty-nine are members of the United Nations, 
close to 28 percent of developing countries, and 20 percent of the UN’s total membership. 
Together, SIDS communities constitute roughly five percent of the global population.  
 
AOSIS members contribute very little to anthropogenic climate change, but are the first to 
feel its most destructive effects (as President Obama describes it), which derails their 
development gains. While many AOSIS members have committed to significant emission 
reductions and are scaling-up the share of their energy budget using renewable energy 
sources, their national actions alone will not protect their citizens from extreme weather 
                                                          
2 Remarks by President Obama at the First Session of COP21, Paris, France, November 30, 
2015.  https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/30/remarks-president-obama-first-session-
cop21 
3 Alliance of Small Island States; About AOSIS (2015). http://aosis.org/about/.  
4 Ibid. Members are; Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Cape Verde, Comoros, Cook Islands, 
Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Federated States of Micronesia, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, 
Haiti, Jamaica, Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, 
Singapore, Seychelles, Sao Tome and Principe, Solomon Islands, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Suriname, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Observers; American 
Samoa, Netherlands Antilles, Guam, U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. Member States of AOSIS work together 
primarily through their New York diplomatic Missions to the United Nations. AOSIS functions on the basis of 
consultation and consensus. Major policy decisions are taken at ambassadorial-level plenary sessions. The 
Alliance does not have a formal charter. There is no regular budget, nor a secretariat. With the Permanent 
Representative of Maldives as its current chairman, AOSIS operates, as it did under previous chairmanships, out 




events and rising sea levels that threaten their economies and way of life, and in some cases, 
their very existence.  
 
AOSIS has exercised pioneering leadership on climate change, particularly on the urgency of 
deep cuts in greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions since 1990. Notwithstanding their negligible 
contributions to global greenhouse gas emissions, AOSIS members are epic proponents on 
actions to address climate change. AOSIS vast experience as an ad hoc states climate club and 
their ongoing political crusade on climate change make it all the more reasons for AOSIS as a 
whole or its individual Members to lead international efforts in Pioneers Alliances for Climate 
Action via climate clubs.  
 
2.0 Climate Club: Strategic vision and objectives  
 
Vision: A decarbonised global economy by 2050 that can also withstand climate shocks. 
 
Mission: To mobilise international coalitions and resources to strengthen the global response 
to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to 
eradicate poverty, including by:   
a) Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-
industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above 
pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and 
impacts of climate change;  
b) Increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster 
climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions development, in a manner that 
does not threaten food production;  
c) Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas 




Strongly reaffirm the principles and objectives set out in the UNFCCC, the Paris 
Agreement/COP21 Outcomes, SDGs Agenda 2030 and the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 




1. To reduce global GHG emissions to at least [X]% by 2030, [Y]% by 2050 and [Z]% by 
2100.  
2. To reduce global average per capita emissions by [X]% by 2030, [Y]% by 2050 
compared with the levels in 1990 and 2010 respectively. 
4 
 
3. To eliminate investments in inefficient fossil fuel subsidies by at least $[X billions] by 
20[YY].   
4. To agree an ‘international target carbon price’ (e.g. at a minimum domestic carbon 
price of $25 per ton of CO2) by 2025. 
5. To incorporate climate mitigation and resilience considerations into ALL Overseas 
Development Assistance and Investment decisions by 2020. 
6. To insensitive investments towards low-carbon growth opportunities  
7. To establish a platform for strategic climate clubs dialogues. 




The selected AOSIS Members (Samoa, Fiji, Singapore, Seychelles, Trinidad and Tobago), 
representing four geo-political regions of AOSIS (Pacific, South China Sea, Indian Ocean and 
the Caribbean) have all made significant progress to address climate change since becoming 
parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).5 Their 
2015 Intended Nationally Determined Contributions’ (INDC) submissions reveal their 
continued willingness to implement QERLs policies and measures (PAMS) at national levels as 
part of their contributions to international mitigation actions.    
 
Table 1: Selected AOSIS Members – current status of ratification of the UNFCCC 
Party Signature Ratification Entry into Force 
Fiji   9 June 1992 25 February 1993 21 March 1994 
Samoa 12 June 1992 29 November 1994 27 February 1995 
Seychelles 10 June 1992 22 September 1992 21 March 1994 
Singapore 13 June 1992 29 May 1997 27 August 1997 




Notwithstanding their commitments in pursuit of the objective of the Convention and being 
guided by its principles, most AOSIS Members (e.g. Pacific Small Island Developing States 
(SIDS)) presently spend 25% of their foreign exchange on imported fossil fuels. Thus energy 
independence of SIDS by decarbonizing the global economy while at the same time withstand 
climate shocks (e.g. extreme weather events) is a game changer path to meeting their 
sustainable development goals (SDGs) by the end of the century, which will in turn reduce 
their vulnerabilities, enhance their capacity to adapt, and develop resilience to face the 
multitude of other challenges they are confronting.  In addition, SIDS can serve as models and 
examples for bigger nations. 








 Coherence with national strategies/priorities   
 
Fiji:  Fiji’s commitments to implementing the Convention are outlined in their National 
Climate Change Policy of 2012. Fiji was also a signatures to the Barbados Plan of Action 1994, 
the Mauritius Strategy 2005-2015, the 2014 SIDS Accelerated Modalities of Actions 
(S.A.M.O.A) Pathway (SAMOA PATHWAY) and other related regional and international 
initiatives to combat climate change (see Table 2 below for a brief summary of Fiji and other 
selected AOSIS countries’ efforts to address climate change). 
 
Samoa:  Samoa is fully committed to the UNFCCC objectives and it embraces all opportunities 
to fulfil them.6 It welcomes support from the global communities who share the same need 
to make the world a better place to live through establishing suitable adaptive and mitigative 
mechanisms. Samoa is committed to reducing its greenhouse gas emissions and at the same 
time pursue a low carbon emission development pathway which would have significant 
economic benefits. The Energy sector, which accounted for 50% of total GHG emissions in 
2007 is targeted for emissions reductions in their INDC submission and in particular the 
electricity sub-sector. The National Energy Coordinating Committee7 has set a target for 
Samoa to generate 100% of its electricity from renewable sources by 2017. This ambitious 
target is supported by a combination of policy level actions and development projects. In 2007 
total emissions from the electricity subsector were 44,214 tCO2-e and represents emissions 
from diesel-fuelled thermal plants. Renewable energy contributed 48% of total electricity 
requirements in 2007. However, by 2014, renewable energy sources including solar 
photovoltaic, wind and hydropower contributed only 26% of total electricity generation due 
the impacts of Tropical Cyclone Pam. The two sectors that contribute most to Samoa’s 
emissions are road transport and livestock farming, which, in 2007, accounted for 27% and 
25% of total CO2-e emissions respectively.  
  
                                                          
6 Supra note 14. 
7 The Committee is chaired by the Prime Minister and comprises key Cabinet Ministers and chief executive 
officers of ministries and agencies in the energy sector.  
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Table 2: AOSIS Selected Members National strategies/priorities, INDC mitigation 
commitments and their CO2 emissions ranking in 2013. 
 
Member  National/ 
Regional Strategies 













Fiji  INDC 
Submission 



















Renewable energy share 
in electricity generation 
to approach 100% by 
2030 from around 60% in 
2013. In addition an 
indicative reduction of 
10% CO2 emissions for 
energy efficiency 
improvements economy 
wide will be sought. 
These measures will 
reduce CO2 emissions in 
the energy sector by 














 MSI (2005) 
 BPoA 
(1994) 
 Energy (power 
generation) 
 Agriculture 
Aims to reduce its GHG 
emissions from the 
electricity sub sector 
through the adoption of a 
100% renewable energy 
target for electricity 









                                                          
8 Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) http://unfccc.int/focus/indc_portal/items/8766.php 
9 http://www.globalcarbonatlas.org/?q=en/emissions Carbon dioxide emissions from the combustion of fossil 
fuels, cement production and land use change over multiple decades, including their drivers.  
10 Fiji INDC submission (2015). 
http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Fiji/1/FIJI_iNDC_Final_051115.pdf 
11 SIDS Accelerated Modalities of Actions Pathway (S.A.M.OA) 
http://www.sids2014.org/index.php?menu=1537 
12 Mauritius Strategies for Implement of the Barbados Programme of Action (1994)  
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/conferences/msi2005 
13 Barbados Programme of Action (1994) http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/dsd_aofw_sids/sids_pdfs/BPOA.pdf 
14 Fiji National Communication Reports (http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/fjinc2.pdf; 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/fjinc1.pdf 
15 Samoa National Communication Reports http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/samnc1.pdf; 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/samnc2.pdf 
16 Samoa’s commitment is conditional on reaching the 100% renewable electricity generation target in 2017 and 
receiving international assistance to maintain this contribution through to 2025.  
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 MSI (2005) 
 BPoA 
(1994) 
 Public electricity, 
land transport 




Aims to reduce its 
economy-wide absolute 
GHG emissions by 122.5 
ktCO2e (21.4%) in 2025 
and estimated 188 
ktCO2e in 2030 (29.0%) 
relative to baseline 
emissions 
0.7 165 















Intends to reduce its 
Emissions Intensity by 
36% from 2005 levels by 
2030, and stabilise its 
emissions with the aim of 










 MSI (2005)  
 BPoA 






Aims to achieve a 
reduction objective in 
overall emissions from 
the three sectors by 15% 
by 2030 from Business as 
Usual, which in absolute 
terms is an equivalent of 
103,000,000 million 
tonnes of CO2e.  
49 62 
 
Singapore: As one of the most globalised economies and a trading nation with no indigenous 
resources, Singapore is heavily dependent on the global supply chain for its food and energy 
security. Its economic activity and emissions are also highly sensitive to the volatility of 
regional and global developments.23 Even so, Singapore’s early actions to reduce emissions, 
despite its lack of alternative energy options, have allowed it to achieve one of the lowest 
emissions intensities globally while still maintaining economic growth. Singapore ranks 
favourably at 113th out of 140 countries.  Singapore’s mitigation efforts include a green 
growth strategy, promoting low carbon trajectories, and pursuing new energy efficiency 
                                                          




18Seychelles National Communication Reports  http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/sycnc2.pdf; 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/seync1.pdf 
19 Singapore INDC Report (2015). 
http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Singapore/1/Singapore%20INDC.pdf 
20 Singapore National Communication Reports https://www.nccs.gov.sg/sites/nccs/files/NCBUR2014_1.pdf; 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/sinnc1.pdf; http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/sinnc2.pdf 
21 Trinidad and Tobago INDC report (2015).  
http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Trinidad%20and%20Tobago/1/Trinidad
%20and%20Tobago%20Final%20INDC.pdf 
22 Trinidad and Tobago National Communication Reports http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/ttonc1.pdf; 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/ttonc2.pdf 
23 Supra note 16.  
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measures over and above those already extensively deployed. Singapore will continue to 
invest significantly in research and development to explore new innovations in low carbon 
technologies.  These efforts entail economic and social opportunity costs, but nevertheless 
will be funded domestically. Singapore recognises its responsibility to contribute to 
international collaborations to address climate change24. Singapore also works closely with 
many partners25 to provide platforms to share experiences, best practices and technical 
knowledge on climate change and green growth issues. Singapore has also broadened and 
deepened its own technical cooperation programmes to share experiences with other 
developing countries.  To date, Singapore has conducted programmes for over 10,700 officials 
from other countries in climate change and sustainable development issues alone.     
 
Seychelles: Seychelles is vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and climate variability, 
and it gives priority concern for adaptation to climate change as communicated in their INDC. 
Given that Seychelles is a net sink, its contributions to climate change mitigation to contribute 
towards the objectives of the UNFCCC will be the co-benefit of enhancing its energy security 
and reducing its energy bill. Seychelles stated categorically in its INDC that it will ‘’reduce its 
economy-wide absolute GHG emissions by 122.5 ktCO2e (21.4%) in 2025 and estimated 188 
ktCO2e in 2030 (29.0%) relative to baseline emissions.” 
 
Trinidad and Tobago: Trinidad and Tobago is the most industrialized economy in the English-
speaking Caribbean. It is the leading Caribbean producer of oil and gas, and its economy is 
mainly based upon these resources. Trinidad and Tobago also supplies manufactured goods, 
mainly food products and beverages, as well as cement, to the Caribbean region. Even though 
other products are also manufactured, oil and gas is the leading economic sector and accounts 
for 40% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 80% of exports. Trinidad and Tobago does not 
contribute largely to the total worldwide GHG emissions. In fact, as of 2013, Trinidad and 
Tobago was ranked 62nd of all the countries if they were classified by total national GHG 
emissions.  The Government recognises the legally binding commitment of all Parties to 
achieving the objective of the UNFCCC (Article 2) and the need for mitigation action by all 
Parties regardless of their quantum of emissions. The mitigation efforts of Trinidad and 
Tobago along with those of all Parties will collectively contribute to the reduction of global 
                                                          
24 Singapore hosts regular international forums such as the World Cities Summit, Singapore International Water 
Week, Singapore International Energy Week, and the Singapore Green Building Week/International Green 
Building Conference, for the sharing of experiences in city planning, climate change adaptation, transport, as 
well as waste and water management. Singapore also actively shares its developmental experiences as an island 
city-state in the C40 Cities Climate Leadership group (C40) Partnering the United Nations Environmental 
Programme (UNEP), the Building and Construction Authority (BCA) of Singapore established the Centre for 
Sustainable Buildings – a first in Asia – to support regional efforts to develop green building policies and actions 
(Singapore INDC report (2015)).    
25 UNFCCC Secretariat, ASEAN member states, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the 
World Meteorological Organisation, the US Government, the UK Government, UK Carbon Trust, the Australian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Germany’s Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH (Singapore INDC, 2015) 
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atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases and the achievement of the objective of the 
UNFCCC.    
 
“Identity crisis”/multiple faces in climate clubs  
 
All five countries share common characteristics. Their emissions are minimal compared to 
other parties (see Table 2 above). Three are currently net sinks. And under the Business-As-
Usual scenario, they are expected to become net emitters by between 2024 and 2025. The 
contributions of the five countries are considered fair and ambitious. With their pledged 
contributions, three will remain net sinks in 2030. The fairness of their contributions also 
relate to the fact that as SIDSs, adaptation remains their highest priorities. Notwithstanding, 
all five countries have placed equal importance on mitigation and adaptation. They recognise 
developing low carbon based economies would not only go to meeting their INDC mitigation 
targets but also towards achieving their SDGs – a win-win-win strategy. To this end, all five 
countries have already laid the required and necessary policy and legislative frameworks for 
climate actions at the national level. They have also committed to ‘unconditional’ mitigation 
actions consistent with the implementation of their National Development Plans, National 
Climate Change Policies and related Strategies. 
 
Ways and means to overcome implementation gap 
 
All five countries INDC submissions described in detail the planning processes they used when 
developing their INDCs. It is an all-inclusive process of engaging relevant stakeholders in and 
outside governments through a number of dialogue and rounds of stakeholders’ 
consultations. Each stated a “whole of government” approach process enabling them to 
produce genuine national ownership of their INDC and also highlighted synergies with other 
UNFCCC-related processes.26 The ownership issue is absolutely vital to the successful 
implementation of any programmes in any country. Ownership, based on trust and genuine 
partnership, ensures that all stakeholders are committed to work together to achieve national 
INDC targets. Another noticeable finding is all countries frame their INDCs from a sustainable 
development’ lens rather than from a climate change (environmental) lens.27  
 
                                                          
26 See countries National Communications, Biennial Update Reports, National Adaptation Planning, and 
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs).    
27 Samoa highlighted their Strategy for Development of Samoa (SDS) the key strategies for development across 
the priority sectors. The overarching theme for the SDS 2012 – 2016 is Boosting productivity for sustainable 
development. The SDS highlights the importance of the environment as a priority area and has identified the 
mainstreaming of climate change across all sectors and increased investment in renewable energy as some of 
the main strategic outcomes.  This political commitment to mainstream climate change issues is driving a 
number of actions that are aimed at not only adapting to the impacts of climate change but also accelerating 
efforts to reduce GHG emissions.  
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The highest priority focused area for all countries INDCs is economic inputs (energy inputs in 
particular). All INDCs submissions stated that addressing economic and related inputs will 
allow development approaches that reduce emissions, whilst at the same time promoting 
sustainable development more generally – a point also advocated by many analysts and 
observers of the climate regime.28   
 
Energy-related CO2 emissions, which account for the majority of the five selected countries 
total emissions are determined by the size of the population, the size of the economy, the 
energy intensity of the economy and the CO2 intensity of energy supply. Not surprisingly, all 
five selected countries focused their INDCs on QERLs PAMS to improve energy productivity of 
their economies and the CO2 productivity of energy provision.29     
 
 
3.0 Prerequisites to join a Climate Club  
 
A quick analysis of the literature (e.g. Weischer, et al., 201230; Widerberg and Stenson, 201331; 
Ott, et. al., 201432; Falkner, 201533; Nordhaus, 201534) reveals a range of views on the 
potential  benefits of countries, alliances and non-country actors (private sector) joining 
climate clubs.  
 
To better understand what sort of requirements is needed for AOSIS (as a group or 
individually) to be considered as eligible for climate clubs, it is best to begin with some 
definitions. A club is defined as ‘a voluntary group deriving mutual benefits from sharing the 
costs of producing an activity that has public-good characteristics.’35  The gains from a 
successful club are sufficiently large that members will pay dues and adhere to club rules in 
order to gain the benefits of memberships.36 Climate Clubs is defined as ‘smaller groups of 
countries that take action outside of the UNFCCC. It includes any grouping that comprises 
more than two and less than the full multilateral set of countries party to the UNFCCC and 
that has not reached degree of institutionalisation of an international organization.’37  
                                                          
28 Otto et al., 2014. Climate policy: road works and new horizons – an assessment of the UNFCC process from 
Lima to Paris and beyond, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY – Law, Policy and Practice, www.lawtext.com  . 
29 See Table 2.  
30 Weishcher, et al., (2012): Climate Clubs: Can a Small Group of Countries make a big difference in addressing 
climate change? Review of European Community & International Environmental Law, RECIEL 21(3) 2012. ISSN 
0962-8797. 
31 Widerbery, O and D. Stenson, (2013) Climate Clubs and the UNFCCC, FORES Study 2013: 3.  
32 Supra 23.  
33 Falkner, R. (2015): A minilateral solution for global climate change? On bargaining efficiency, club benefits 
and international legitimacy. Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, Working Paper No. 22. 
Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, Working paper Bo. 197. 
34 Supra note 2.  
35 Ibid.  
36 Ibid. 




The obvious question, then, is what sort of benefits must a club offer in order to be attractive 
for AOSIS (or its members) to join? Broadly speaking, club memberships should be voluntary, 
such that members share mutual benefits (e.g. financial rewards).  These include sharing the 
costs of production for an activity that has public-good characteristics and providing gains for 
members that are sufficiently large that members will pay dues and adhere to club rules in 
order to gain the benefits of memberships – no ‘club hopping.‘  
 
Clubs should also help members reduce their GHG mitigation costs (via facilitating and 
creating what former UNFCCC negotiator for Sweden, Bo Kjellen, calls “enabling conditions“ 
- meaning that agreement at the international level can only be met when national conditions 
are favourable for an agreement), which is likely to increase their williness to commit to more 
mitigation actions.  
 
Implementation and enegry clubs for examples can be conducive to lowering abatement costs 
of climate change and thereby make international interests of climate change and  national 
interests more prone to action.  
 
Climate Clubs must be conducive to the UNFCCC, not operating outside of the UNFCCC. 
Questions such as to what extent climate clubs adhere to core norms, principles, and activities 
of the UNFCCC need to be considered. (e.g. should climate clubs contribute to the 
implementation of agreements under the UNFCCC such as the proposed Paris Work 
Programme on Capacity Building (PWPCB) under the (draft) 2015 Paris Agreement) and 
related international treaties (e.g. World Trade Organization Marrakech Agreement?)).  
 
Climate clubs should also fill governance gaps in the UNFCCC. REDD+, biofuels and black 
carbon, for example, are climate topics which are discussed in the negotiations, but usually 
only operatized in climate clubs. 
 
For AOSIS, all three types of climate clubs (energy, state and implementation) are relevant to 
their needs and interests. But from a decarbonize economic system perspective, energy clubs 
are the most attractive. The core aim of energy clubs is to spread clean energy technologies 
and improve energy eficiency. Energy clubs are also particulalry attractive due to potentially 
high co-benefits (relative pure emissions-reduction initiatives) for example, gain in energy 
eifiicency can reduce GHG emissions and improve energy security.  
 
AOSIS are already engaged in R&D in low carbon and renewable energy technologies and 
promoting activities aimed at increasing market-update of low carbon and renewable 
technology. Examples of existing energy clubs already operating within AOSIS regions include; 
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the Energy and Security Group (ESG)38, the Global Renewable Energy Island Network 
(GREIN)39 and Small Island Developing renewable energy knowledge and transfer network 
(DIREKT).40   
 
 
4.0 Summary & Recommendations  
 
Despite AOSIS history of limited success in securing outcomes from major multilateral climate 
change and related negotiations in their favour, AOSIS should not shy away from continuing 
to push for initiatives that would result in a speedy transition to a decarbonised global 
economic system. Notwithstanding their commitments in pursuit of the objective of the 
UNFCCC and being guided by its principles, SIDS currently spend 25% of their foreign exchange 
on imported fossil fuels. Thus energy independence of SIDS by decarbonizing the global 
economy while at the same time withstand climate shocks (e.g. extreme weather events) is a 
game changer pathway to their economic development, which will in turn reduce their 
vulnerabilities, enhance their capacity to adapt, and develop resilience to face the multitude 
of other challenges they are confronting.   
 
AOSIS should therefore offer their full support to those countries (e.g. Germany, Brazil, India, 
China, South Africa, Chile, Gambia, Tanzania, etc) and non-state actors working to achieve 
speedy transition to a decarbonised global economic system. Similarly, those states and non-
state actors pioneering alliances for speedy transition to a decarbonised economic system 
should consider making special concessions to accommodate AOSIS as a group or individually 
to join future pioneer alliances.  For AOSIS, the benefits of joining and pioneering the pioneer 
alliances are highly uncertain due to lack of information/studies. There is no research to date 
regarding climate clubs and their potential benefits (and cost and damage) to AOSIS and vice 
versa. This needs urgent attention. In addition, research should also be conducted into the 
(potential) effects of international trade and tariffs on the economic welfare of AOSIS regions 
in a decarbonised world. Similarly, a research into whether a trade-penalty-plus-carbon price 
regime can operate in the future with rising carbon prices associated with an efficient climate 
change scheme as suggested by Nordhaus (2015).  Moreover, research into the merits of a 




                                                          
38 http://www.energyandsecurity.com/home.html 
39 https://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/events/2013/March/GREIN/1_Jeffrey_Skeer.pdf 
40 http://www.direkt-project.eu/ 
